This paper presents a secure and private implementation of linear time-invariant dynamic controllers using Paillier's encryption, a semi-homomorphic encryption method. To avoid overflow or underflow within the encryption domain, the state of the controller is reset periodically. A control design approach is presented to ensure stability and optimize performance of the closed-loop system with encrypted controller.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) has brought opportunities for flexibility of deployment and efficiency improvements. However, it threatens security and privacy of individuals and businesses as IoT devices, by design, share their information for processing over the cloud. This information can be secured from adversaries over the network by using encrypted communication channels [1] . This approach, although effective and necessary, does not address vulnerability of the data on servers running cloud-computing services. These services themselves can use the data for targeted advertisement or can be hacked for malicious purposes. Therefore, there is a need for a more secure methodology that addresses the security and privacy of data while being processed.
Thankfully secure cloud computing is possible with the use of homomorphic encryption methods -encryption methods that allow computation over plain data by performing appropriate computations on the encrypted data [2] - [4] . The use of homomorphic encryption allows a controller to be remotely realised without needing to openly sharing private and sensitive data (and consenting to its use in an unencrypted manner). This paper specifically discusses secure and private implementation of linear time-invariant dynamic controllers with the aid of the Paillier's encryption [3] , a semi-homomorphic encryption method.
The use of homomorphic encryption for secure control has been studied previously [5] - [10] . However, all these studies consider static controllers. This is because, when dealing with dynamical control laws (with an encrypted memory/state that must be maintained remotely), the number of bits required for representing the state of the controller grows linearly with the number of iterations. This renders the memory useless after a few iterations due to an overflow or an underflow (i.e., number of fractional bits required for representing a number becomes larger than the number of fractional bits in the fixedpoint number basis). In fact, using rough calculations, it can C. Murguia be seen that for a system with sampling time of 10 ms, 16 bits quantized controller parameters and measurements, and within an encryption space of 1024 bits 1 , the state of the controller becomes incorrect after roughly 0.7 sec due to an overflow or underflow. To avoid this issue, the encrypted state can be sent to a trust third-party (e.g., an IoT device) to be decrypted, rounded, encrypted, and transmitted back. This adds unnecessary communication overhead and overburdens the computational units of the IoT device. Furthermore, by decrypting the state, the risk of a privacy or security breach increases. A better approach is to reset the controller, i.e., the state of the controller is set to a publicly known number (e.g., zero) periodically. In this case, the controller must be redesigned to ensure stability/performance. This paper addresses this problem.
Resetting controllers have been previously studied in [11] - [15] . However, the synthesis approach in this paper is more general than those studies and further it is designed to accommodate challenges associated with the implementation of dynamical controllers over the cipher space.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Preliminary materials on homomorphic encryption are presented in Section II. The design and implementation of the controller is discussed in Section III. Finally, numerical results are presented in Section IV and the paper is concluded in Section V. All proofs are presented in the appendices to improve the overall presentation of the paper.
II. PRELIMINARY MATERIAL
In this paper, a tuple (P, C, K, E, D) denotes a public key encryption scheme, where P is the set of plaintexts, C is the set of ciphertexts, K is the set of keys, E is the encryption algorithm, and D is the decryption algorithm. Each κ = (κ p , κ s ) ∈ K is composed of a public key κ p (which is shared with and used by everyone for encrypting plaintexts) and a private key κ s (which is maintained only by the trusted parties for decryption). Algorithms E and D are publicly known while the keys, which set the parameters of these algorithms, are generated and used in each case. The use of the term "algorithm", instead of mapping or function, is due to the presence of random 2 elements in the encryption procedure possibly resulting in one plaintext being mapped to multiple ciphertexts. A necessary requirement for the encryption scheme is to be invertible, i.e., D(E(x, κ p ), κ p , κ s ) = x for all x ∈ P given κ = (κ p , κ s ) ∈ K. Definition 1 (Homomorphic Encryption) Assume there exist operators • and ⋄ such that (P, •) and (C, ⋄) form groups. A public key encryption (P, C, K, E, D) is called called ho-
Most commonly, P and C are, respectively, two finite rings of integers Z np and Z nc with n p = |P| and n c = |C|, where |A| denotes the cardinality of any set A and Z q := {0, . . . , q − 1} = {n mod q : ∀n ∈ Z} for all positive integers q ∈ N. A public key encryption (P, C, K, E, D) is additively homomorphic if there exists an operator ⋄ such that Definition 1 is satisfied when the operator • is defined as x 1 • x 2 := (x 1 + x 2 ) mod n p for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ P. For additively homomorphic schemes, in this paper, the notation ⊕ is used to denote the equivalent operator in the ciphertext domain (⋄ in the definition above). Similarly, a public key encryption is multiplicatively homomorphic if there exists an operator ⋄ such that Definition 1 is satisfied with • defined as x 1 • x 2 := (x 1 x 2 ) mod n p for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ P. If a public key encryption is both additively and multiplicatively homomorphic, it is fully homomorphic but, if only one of these conditions is satisfied, it is semi-homomorphic. Homomorphism shows there exist operations over ciphertexts that can generate encrypted versions of sumed or multiplied plaintexts without the need of decrypting their corresponding cuphertexts. An example of additively homomorphic encryption scheme is the Paillier's encryption method [3] . ElGamal is an example of multiplicatively homomorphic encryption schemes [4] . Recently, several fully homomorphic encryption methods have been also developed, see, e.g., [2] . Now, we define semantic security. A key κ = (κ p , κ s ) ∈ K is randomly generated. A probabilistic polynomial timebounded adversary proposes x 1 , x 2 ∈ P. The agent chooses at random x from {x 1 , x 2 } with equal probability, encrypts x according to y = E(x, κ p ), and sends y to the adversary (along with the public key κ p ). The adversary produces x ′ , which is an estimate of x based on all the avialable information (everything except κ s , i.e., x 1 , x 2 , y, E, D, κ p ). The adversary's advantage (in comparison to that of a pure random number generator) is given by Adv(|K|) := |P{x = x ′ }−1/2|. The public key encryption (P, C, K, E, D) is semantically secure (alternatively known as indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack) if Adv is negligible 3 .
In this paper, the results are presented for the Paillier's encryption method. It is notworthy that the Paillier's encryption method is semantically secure under the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption, i.e., it is "hard" to decide whether there exists y ∈ Z N 2 such that x = y N mod N for N ∈ Z and x ∈ Z N 2 . More information regarding the assumption can be found in [3] , [16] . This can be used to establish the security of the proposed framework. The Paillier's encryption scheme is as follows. First the public and private keys are generated. To do so, large prime numbers p and q are selected randomly and independently of each other such that gcd(pq, (1 − p)(1 − q)) = 1, where gcd(a, b) refers to the greatest common divisor of integers a and b. The public key (which is shared with all the parties and is used for encryption) is κ p = pq. The private key (which is only available to the entity that needs to decrypt the data) is κ s = (λ, µ) with λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) and µ = λ −1 mod κ p , where lcm(a, b) is the least common multiple of integers a and b. The ciphertext of plain message
Proposition 1 shows that the Paillier's encryption is a semihomomorphic encryption scheme, i.e., algebraic manipulation of the plain data is possible without decryption using appropriate operations over the encrypted data. The Paillier's encryption is additively homomorphic with operator ⊕ being defined as
1 mod N 2 for all x 1 ∈ C and x 2 ∈ P. Note that △ is not an operator (in the mathematical sense) as its operands belong to two difference sets; it is just a mapping.
III. DYNAMIC CONTROLLER IMPLEMENTATION
Consider the discrete-time linear time invariant system P : (1) is controlled by a dynamic output feedback controller of the form C:
with controller state x c [k] ∈ R nc . It is assumed that the state of the controller resets every T time steps, i.e., x c [ℓT ] = 0 for all ℓ ∈ N. This is because implementing encrypted controllers over an infinite horizon is impossible due to memory issues (by multiplication of fractional numbers, the number of bits required for representing fractional and integer parts grow). Combining the dynamics in (1) and (2) results in the augmented system:
where
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for the asymptotic stability of the origin of (1) in feedback with the resetting controller (2) .
, and ǫ ∈ (0, ∞) satisfying:
Proof: See Appendix A. The following result provides a sufficient condition for the stabilizability of the system using the resetting controller.
For µ * ∈ [−1, 0) and ǫ * ∈ (0, ∞) in Proposition 2, the following problem can be solved to find the smallest resetting horizon T for the dynamical controller:
A. Synthesis of Resetting Controllers
Here, we provide tools for designing full order (n c = n x ) resetting controllers of the form (2) satisfying (5) . That is, we look for matrices
, ε ∈ (0, 1), and T ∈ N. Let n c = n x and P be positive definite. Consider F (P, C) in (4) and define:
For simplicity of notation, in this subsection, F (P, C) and F (P, C) are denoted by F andF , respectively. Then, (5b) and (5c) can be written as
where 0 denotes the zero matrix of appropriate dimensions. Using properties of the Schur complement, inequalities (8) are fulfilled if and only if the following is satisfied:
Note that the blocks P F and PF are nonlinear functions of (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ). We propose a change of variables: (10) so that, in the variables ν, we can obtain new affine matrix inequalities equivalent to (9) . In particular, for positive definite P and nonlinear matrix inequalities L ≥ 0 andL ≥ 0, we aim at finding two invertible matrices Y and T , and variables ν such that the congruence transformations
Let P be positive definite and partitioned as follows:
with X, U,X ∈ R nx×nx and positive definite X,X. Define
Using block matrix inversion formulas, it can be verified that
Define (12). Then, the transformations L → T ⊤ LT andL → T ⊤L T can be written as
Using the structure of F andF and the change of variables:
the blocks ZF Y and ZF Y can be written as
(18) Therefore, under T and the change of variables in (16), we can write T ⊤ LT and T ⊤L T as follows:
with P(ν), F(ν), andF(ν) as defined in (13), (17), and (18), respectively. Therefore, the original matrix inequality, L 0 defined in (9) , that depends non-linearly on the decision variables (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) is transformed into a new inequality, L(ν) 0, that is an affine function of the variables ν. Note, however, that S(ν) 0 (the blockF(ν)) is still nonlinear in the new variables ν. In the following lemma, we give a sufficient condition, in terms of an affine inequality L(ν) 0, for S(ν) to be positive semidefinite.
Lemma 1 Consider P(ν) and S(ν) defined in (13) and (20), respectively. Define the matrices:
Then,L(ν) 0 ⇒ S(ν) 0.
Proof: See Appendix C. Lemma 1 provides a sufficient condition,L(ν) 0, for the nonlinear matrix S(ν) to be positive semidefinite. ThisL(ν) is an affine function of ν. Note, however, that finding ν satisfying (P(ν) ≻ 0, L(ν) 0,L(ν) 0) might not be sufficient to guarantee the existence of (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) satisfying (P ≻ 0, L 0,L 0). For this to be true, matrices Y and T must be invertible so that the transformations P → Y ⊤ P Y = P(ν), L → T ⊤ LT = L(ν), andL → T ⊤L T = S(ν) are congruence transformations; and ν must render the change of variables in (16) 
for P = Y −⊤ P(ν)Y −1 and the controller matrices in (40) obtained by inverting (16) . In the following lemma, we summarize the discussion presented above.
Lemma 3 For given system matrices (A, B, C). If there exist matrices ν = (X, Y,
, and L(ν) as defined in (13), (19), and (22), respectively; then, there exist (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) satisfying P > 0, L ≥ 0, andL ≥ 0 with P , L, andL as defined in (9) and (11), respectively. Moreover, for every ν such that P(ν) > 0, L(ν) ≥ 0, andL(ν) ≥ 0, the change of variables in (16) and matrix Y in (12) are invertible and the (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) obtained by inverting (13) and (16) are unique and satisfy the analysis inequalities (8) .
Proof: See Appendix E. By Lemma 3, the matrices (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) obtained by inverting (13) and (16) satisfy inequalities (8) (and thus also (5b) and (5c)). Moreover, because the reconstructed P is positive definite, inequality (5a) is satisfied with ǫ = λ min (P ), where λ min (P ) ∈ R >0 denotes the smallest eigenvalue of P . Next, we give the synthesis result corresponding to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 For given system matrices (A, B, C) and constants ε ∈ (0, 1), µ ∈ [−1, 0), δ ∈ [1, ∞), and T ∈ N satisfying (5d), if there exist matrices ν = (X, Y, K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 ) satisfying P(ν) > 0, L(ν) ≥ 0, andL(ν) ≥ 0; then, P = Y −⊤ P(ν)Y and the controller matrices in (40) satisfy the analysis inequalities (5a)-(5c) and thus render the closedloop dynamics (1)-(2) asymptotically stable.
Proof: See Appendix F. Controller Reconstruction. For given ν satisfying the synthesis inequalities (P(ν) > 0, L(ν) ≥ 0,L(ν) ≥ 0): 1) For given X and Y , compute via singular value decomposition a full rank factorization V U ⊤ = I − Y X with square and nonsingular V and U . 2) For given ν and invertible V and U , solve the system of equations Y ⊤ P T = P(ν) and (16) to obtain the matrices (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ). Remark 1 Note that ε, µ, δ, and T , in Theorem 2 must be fixed before looking for feasible solutions ν satisfying the synthesis LMIs: P(ν) > 0, L(ν) ≥ 0, andL(ν) ≥ 0. However, for any µ ∈ [−1, 0) and δ ∈ [1, ∞), there always exist ε ∈ (0, 1) and T ∈ N satisfying (5d). Moreover, the synthesis LMIs depend on ν, δ, and µ but not on ε and T . Therefore, to find feasible controllers, we only have to fix (µ, δ) and look for ν satisfying the synthesis LMIs. The constants (µ, δ) are, in fact, variables of the synthesis problem; however, to linearize some of the constraints, we fix their value and search over µ ∈ [−1, 0) and δ ∈ [1, ∞) to find feasible ν. The latter increases the computations needed to find controllers; however, we can perform a bisection search over δ ∈ [1, ∞) and, because µ ∈ [−1, 0) (a bounded set), a grid search over µ to decrease the required computations.
B. Dynamic Controller Implementation
Before stating the next result, we introduce some notation. Define A max := max i,j |a ij |, where a ij denotes the entry in i-th row and j-th column of matrix A, and Q(n, m) :
The quantization of X ∈ R p×q is defined as proj(x, Q(n, m) p×q ) ∈ arg min x ′ ∈A x ′ − x max and the quantization error as proj(x, Q(n, m) p×q ) − x max . Please refer to [6] for details about the quantization scheme. Proof: The proof follows from continuity of the eigenvalues. Note that, by increasing n and m, the quantization error decreases (actually, it tends to zero).
In what follows, we discuss the implementation of quantized resetting controllers using homomorphic encryption schemes and quantized sensor measurements. The controller, in this case, is given bȳ C:
whereĀ c ,B c ,C c , andD c are defined in (24) and
The difference betweenC in (25) andC in Theorem 3 is the quantization of the output measurements y[k]. The following standing assumption is made in this paper to ensure the stability of the closed-loop system.
Assumption 1 n ≥n and m ≥m wheren andm are given in Theorem 3.
The following theorem proves the stability of the system P with the quantized resetting controllerC. Note that, for any Proof: See Appendix G Theorem 4 implies that the state of the system converges to a vicinity of the origin (instead of the origin itself) due to quantization effects. The volume of the this area can be arbitrarily reduced by increasing m and thus the performance of the system can be arbitrarily improved. withñ > (n c + 1)T + n u + n(T + 2), the resetting quantized controller in (25) can be rewritten as C:
(28)
Note that, by Lemma 4,Ã c ,B c ,C c ,D c ,x c ,ỹ,ũ are positive integers. This is useful because the Paillier's scheme can only work with finite ring of positive integers. Therefore, the update equation can now be implemented using Paillier's encryption scheme. The correctness of this implementation follows from the results of [6] on fixed-point rational numbers. First, the public and private keys must be generated such that κ p ≥ 2ñ +1 to ensure that no unintended overflow occurs when using the encrypted numbers. The sensors measure, quantize, and encrypt the output to obtaiň
The controller follows the encrypted version of (28) to update its state and compute the actuation signal as
Finally, the actuator extract the control signal bỹ
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Consider system (1) with matrices A, B, C as follows: 
Note that eig[A] = {1.59, 1.0059 ± 0.12i}, i.e., the system is open-loop unstable. First, using the synthesis results in Section III, we design dynamic output feedback controllers of the form (2). Using Theorem 2, bisection in δ ∈ [1, ∞), and a line search in µ ∈ [−1, 0), we look for the smallest δ for which there exist µ ∈ [−1, 0) and ν satisfying the synthesis LMIs in Theorem 2. The obtained δ is given by δ = δ * = 2.75, the corresponding µ is µ = µ * = −0.05, the resetting horizon is T = T * = argmin T ∈N δ * (1 + µ * ) T = 20, and the reconstructed (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) (see Section III) are given in (33). These controller, P , δ, and µ satisfy the original analysis inequalities in (5) with ǫ = λ min (P ) = 0.09 and any ε ∈ (δ * (1 + µ * ) T * , 1) = (0.9858, 1). For comparison, we let µ = µ * = −0.5 and look for the largest δ for which there exists ν satisfying the synthesis LMIs in Theorem 2. In this case, δ * = 250, the smallest resetting horizon Fig. 1 . Norm of the state of the closed-loop system ||x[k]|| 2 with quantized controller (25) and quantizer resolution (n, m) = (16, 9) .
is T * = argmin T ∈N δ * (1 + µ * ) T = 8, the reconstructed (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) are in (34), ǫ = λ min (P ) = 0.0037, and ε ∈ (0.9765, 1). Next, we quantize the controller matrices according to (24) to obtain (Ā c ,B c ,C c ,D c ) with quantizer resolution (n, m) = (16, 9) . It can be verified that for (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) in both (33) and (34), and (n, m) = (16, 9) , the corresponding (Ā c ,B c ,C c ,D c ) and the same P satisfy the conditions of Theorem 4. We quantize sensor measurements y[k] according to (26) with the same resolution (n, m) = (16, 9) , and close the system dynamics with the quantized controller in (25). By Theorem 4, the quantizer resolution must satisfy inequality (27) to ensure practical stability of the closed-loop dynamics (1),(25) in the sense of Theorem 4. Inequality (27), with initial condition [x(0) T , x c (0) T ] = [−6.83, −5.18, −4.05, 0, 0, 0], amounts to n > 16 for P in (33) and to n > 15 for P in (34). Therefore, (n, m) = (16, 9) is enough for practical stabilization using the controllers in (33) and (34). Figures 1 and 2 show ||x(k)|| 2 and ||x c (k)|| 2 of the closed-loop dynamics (1),(25) for quantized matrices corresponding to controllers (33) and (34) with (n, m) = (16, 9) .
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A secure and private implementation of linear time-invariant dynamic controllers using the Paillier's encryption was presented. The state is reset to zero periodically to avoid data overflow or underflow within the encryption space. A control design approach was presented to ensure the stability and performance of the closed-loop system with encrypted controller. Future work can focus on nonlinear dynamical systems and controllers. 
Therefore,
Now, note that
Combining (36) and (37) results in
). This shows that lim ℓ→∞ V (z[ℓT ]) = 0. Following (35), it can be seen that lim k→∞ V (z[k]) = 0. This proves the stability of the system.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Note that if n c = n x , (A, B) is stabilizable, and (A, C) is detectable, one can design a Luenberger observer to make sure that the system is exponentially stable. Therefore, conditions (5a) and (5b) can be met. For n c > n x , unobservable and uncontrollable states can be added to the controller in addition to the Luenberger observer.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The blockF(ν) can be factored as
Then, by properties of the Schur complement, S(ν) 0 if and only if
(38) therefore, using the Schur complement again, S(ν) 0 if and only if δP(ν)
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Let P(ν) be positive definite; then, by properties of the Schur complement, Y > 0 and X − Y −1 > 0, and because Y X + V U ⊤ = I by construction (see (12) ), V U ⊤ = I − Y X < 0, i.e., the matrix V U ⊤ is nonsingular. Therefore, if P(ν) > 0, it is always possible to find nonsingular U and V satisfying Y X + V U ⊤ = I. Nonsingular V implies that Y and T are invertible. Moreover, nonsingular U and V imply that the matrices:
are invertible. Therefore, the controller matrices:
are the unique solution of the matrix equation (16) .
APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Assume that ν is such that P(ν) > 0, L(ν) ≥ 0, and L(ν) ≥ 0. Then, by Lemma 2, Y and T are square and nonsingular and thus the transformations P → Y ⊤ P Y = P(ν), L → T ⊤ LT = L(ν), andL → T ⊤L T = S(ν) are congruent. By Lemma 1,L(ν) ≥ 0 ⇒ S(ν) ≥ 0. It follows that (P(ν) > 0, L(ν) ≥ 0,L(ν) ≥ 0) imply (P > 0, L ≥ 0,L ≥ 0) because (P(ν), L(ν), S(ν)) have the same signature as (P, L,L), respectively, andL(ν) ≥ 0 ⇒ S(ν) ≥ 0. Because P(ν) > 0, the matrices U and V are nonsingular. This implies that the change of variables in (16) and T are invertible and lead to unique (P, A c , B c , C c , D c ) by inverting (13) and (16) .
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 2
If ν satisfies P(ν) > 0, L(ν) ≥ 0, andL(ν) ≥ 0, by Lemma 3, the change of variables in (16) and matrix Y in (12) are invertible and the controller matrices (40) and P obtained by inverting (13) and (16) are unique and satisfy inequalities (5a)-(5c) with ǫ = λ min (P ). Therefore, because (5d) is satisfied by assumption, by Theorem 1, the controller matrices in (40) render the closed-loop dynamics (1)-(2) asymptotically stable.
APPENDIX G PROOF OF THEOREM 4
For the sake brevity F (P,C) is denoted byF . First, note that
For i = T , it can be seen that
Combining these update rules shows that
Note that
where the last equality follows from that the quantization error is bounded by θ 
APPENDIX H PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Noting that the controller resets every T steps, we only need to prove this result for k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}. At k = 0, x c [k] = 0 and thus x c [1] ∈ Q(n y +2n, 2m) because the entries ofB cȳ [k] belong to Q(n y + 2n, 2m). For all k ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, if the entries of x c [k] belong to Q(n ′ , m ′ ), the entries of A c x c [k] (at worst case) belong to Q(n c + n + n ′ , m + m ′ ) and the entries ofB cȳ [k] belong to Q(n y + 2n, 2m), therefore the entries of x[k + 1] =Ā c x c [k] +B cȳ [k] must belong to Q(n c + n + n ′ + 1, m + m ′ ) because n y ≤ n c , n ≤ n ′ , and m ≤ m ′ . Furthermore, u[k] must belong to Q(n c + n + n ′ + 1, m+m ′ ). This proves that the entries of x c [k] and u[k] must, respectively, belong to Q((n c + n + 1)(k mod T − 1) + n y + 2n, m(k mod T − 1) + 2m) and Q((n c + n + 1)(k mod T ) + n y + 2n, m(k mod T ) + 2m).
